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On its foundation in 1949, securing its strategic periphery and 
annexation of Tibet and Xinjiang was one of the primary goals of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). With the multiple aims of achieving 
economic, strategic, and political dominance, China has further 
enhanced its connectivity with Asia, Africa and Eurasia by its Belt and 
Road initiative (BRI). Considering the rapidly changing geopolitics and 
economic challenges, the Chinese, as part of their long-term designs, have 
whipped up ‘nationalism’ by multiple means. The military interventions, 
assertiveness and expansionism to have been based on a design to serve its 
national interests—especially the economic, political, and strategic ones. 
The boundary dispute between India and China continues to remain 
unresolved, due to certain designs of the PRC. It is important to analyse 
the strategic significance of Eastern Ladakh, especially when additional 
security personnel have been inducted into Gilgit Baltistan region by 
China as part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). 
Despite the border management mechanisms and confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) in place, and the periodic engagements at different 
levels, the PLA surprised the Indians by contacting and/or transgressing 
across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on a wide front in Eastern 
Ladakh in May 2020. Thus, China’s designs call for India to improve 
its preparedness, and review its policy, to pursue its goals and maintain 
peace and stability in the region.
Lieutenant General (Dr.) V. K. Ahluwalia (Retd) is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 
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Introduction
“A military is built to fight. Our military must regard combat 
capability as the criterion to meet in all its work and focus on how to 
win when it is called on.”
—Xi Jinping, 20171
“The era of expansionism is over; this is the era of development. It is this 
mindset of expansionism that did great harm. [...] India’s commitment 
to peace should not be seen as India’s weakness.”
—Narendra Modi, 20202
The defining trend of the 21st century, undisputedly, has been the rise of 
the People’s Republic of China with sustained economic growth for over three 
decades. According to the UK-based Centre for Economics and Business 
Research (CEBR), released on 27 December 2020, China is expected to be 
the largest economy by 2028, five years earlier than the previous forecast, and 
that India is expected to be the third-largest economy by 2030.3 In addition, 
over the years, China has progressively transformed into a strong military 
power, with a vibrant defence industrial base which focuses on technology, 
innovation, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence (AI) and disruptive 
technology-enabled systems. In the future, it also aims to be the leader in 
other domains such as cyber, information, and space. Concurrently, it would 
be prudent to analyse the impact of China’s new concept of Military-Civil 
Fusion (MCF), which states that the ‘PRC pursues its development strategy 
to “fuse” its economic and social development strategies with its security 
strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in 
support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.4 
With the multiple aims of achieving economic, strategic, and political 
dominance, China has further enhanced its connectivity with Asia, Africa 
and Eurasia by its BRI, covering about 120 countries and 60 per cent of 
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the world’s population. It is well known that China, with its economic 
strength and military muscle, plans to dominate the Western Pacific 
Ocean and expand into the Indian Ocean. What is worrisome is that with 
the ongoing pandemic and the growing instability worldwide, it has been 
assertive and expansionist in its designs, laying illegal claims to territories 
both on the continental and maritime domains. Is it in conformity with 
Sun Tzu’s dictum, ‘In the midst of chaos, there is also an opportunity?’ 
Given the geopolitical considerations of the Indian subcontinent, it 
was stressed that “[….] India is the heart of Asia, and that the Indian 
Ocean is India’s Ocean, it treated the South Asian subcontinent as its 
sphere of influence […]”.5 As China realised India’s geo-strategic location 
in Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, its historical, cultural 
and religious linkages, and its potential, and capability to be a prominent 
regional cum global power, it has taken initiatives, by design, to balance 
India’s growing power by developing relationship with India’s immediate 
neighbours on the subcontinent, with an ‘all-weather friendship’ with 
Pakistan. As part of its long-term vision, it has indulged in ‘strategic 
encirclement’ of India by establishing footholds and developing 
infrastructure in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives, 
and others. While all this has been possible due to its long-term planning 
and implementation, it certainly adds to India’s security concerns.
The paper aims to briefly analyse the early years of the PRC and its 
designs to gain strategic advantage by securing its strategic periphery, and 
the rationale for military interventions at different stages. Besides analysing 
the build-up and stand-off in Eastern Ladakh, it also examines the India-
China boundary dispute, the strategic significance of the Western Sector 
(Ladakh) in particular, as it experiences maximum incidents along the 
undemarcated border—the Line of Actual Control. It also attempts to 
answer the reason as to why China, by design, has not shown any interest 
to resolve the boundary dispute, and also provide an assessment of India’s 
actions in the future.
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Tibet and Xinjiang: The Design
Clausewitz has maintained that “… the only source of war is politics the 
intercourse of governments and peoples”.6 In other words, that war is 
pursuance of political objectives, with all available means. Therefore, 
generally, ‘Military Campaigns’ are not planned on a standalone mode. 
They are intertwined with a suitable combination of political, economic, 
strategic, and military agendas. 
On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong is known to have stood at ramparts 
of the Tiananmen gate to announce the formation of the PRC; and on 31 
December, the same year India recognised PRC7—being the second non-
Communist country to do so. Within three months of formation of the 
PRC, on 1 January 1950, the new Chinese government announced that 
the ‘liberation’ of Tibet would be one of the principal goals of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).8 Sure enough, the Chinese mobilised its 18th Army 
to move into Tibet on 21 January 1950. By the later part of 1950, they 
moved from four provinces of China to converge at Lhasa; the PLA defeated 
the Tibetan Army on 19 October 1950, and the Tibetan leaders signed the 
“Seventeen Point Agreement” in Beijing in 1951.9 It professed to guarantee 
Tibetan autonomy, and to respect the Buddhist religion, but also allowed the 
establishment of Chinese civil and military headquarters at Lhasa.10 As Alfred 
Rubin affirmed that “China clearly emerged as de jure sovereign over the 
territory of Tibet”.11 Thus, after signing of the Agreement on 23 May 1951, 
Tibet was annexed and was under the control of the PRC. 
This context then leads to the understanding of China’s annexation of 
Xinjiang. Much before the foundation of PRC and annexation of Tibet, 
the Chinese leaders had moved their forces in August 1949 against the 
nationalist forces, which were about 70,000 in strength, to control and 
annex the Xinjiang province. By the spring of 1950, Xinjiang was annexed 
and was under the control of the PRC.
These two cases in point make it imperative to ask: What was the 
Chinese perception in the 1940-50s on securing control over Tibet and 
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Xinjiang? To note, Mao declared Tibet to be the palm of China; whereas 
Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and North East Frontier Association 
(NEFA, now Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh) as the five fingers, 
and it is China’s responsibility to ‘liberate’ them all.12 Besides having an 
eye on the rich natural resources of these regions, the Chinese leaders were 
certainly looking forward to securing their borders with Soviet Russia 
and the southern border along the Great Himalayan Mountain Range. 
Simultaneously, the Chinese also wanted to keep their trade routes open 
with Central Asia and Eurasia. Today, 72 years later, both these regions 
provide China with the strategic advantage and connectivity with Eurasia, 
South Asia (Pakistan in particular), and West Asia by its long-term vision 
of BRI and one of its offshoots—the CPEC. Wherein, the latter provides 
access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Thereby, as one can 
construe and as hindsight suggests, China due to its long-term vision, 
had achieved both its aims of securing its borders and trade interests in 
1949 itself. 
Securing Strategic Periphery
In 2000, Michael Swaine and Ashely Tellis emphatically suggested that, 
as per historical records the: 
“Chinese State has employed force against foreigners primarily to 
influence, control, or pacify its strategic periphery and generally 
has done so when it possessed relative superiority over its potential 
adversaries on the periphery”.13 
What calls for such an impression of Chinese extraordinary concern 
about its periphery? There are two plausible reasons for it, that is: First, 
the ancient Chinese had always believed that China was the oldest 
civilisation—the centre of all civilisations, and that it was the centre of 
the earth—the “Middle Kingdom”. It also believed that all activities 
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revolved around China—be it economic, cultural, historical, production, 
innovation, research, and development. Therefore, to retain its lost 
supremacy, ensure economic growth and social change, it was prudent 
to ensure that the Chinese periphery was always secured. Second, the 
impact of the 20th century, which Chinese perceive as the “Century of 
Humiliation”, a period of intervention and subjugation of the Chinese 
Empire and the Republic of China by Western powers, Russia, and Japan 
between 1839 and 1949.14 It all began with the First Opium War (1839-
42) that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Nanking (1842), and 
Hong Kong being ceded to the British. 
China and its Century of Humiliation: Whipped up 
Nationalism
With the end of the Cold War, the world saw a decline in Communism 
in Russia and Yugoslavia, but China saw this as an opportunity to shift its 
focus from ‘Communism to Nationalism’. The Chinese have whipped up 
‘nationalism’ as they initiated the idea of “[…] humiliation an integral part of 
the construction of Chinese nationalism”.15 As William Callahan specifically 
notes “… there are textbooks, novels, museums, songs, and parks devoted to 
commemorating national humiliation in China. […] From 1927 to 1940, in 
Republican China, there was an official holiday called National Humiliation 
Day”.16 These thoughts, when put together in the current environment, 
are also suggestive of the Chinese vision to foresee the problems likely to 
be faced by the country due to domestic and international pressures: the 
slowing economy, post-global economic downturn of 2008 and its impact 
on unemployment; internal security situation; global pressures on account 
of assertiveness and expansionists designs and so on. Owing to these issues, 
the Chinese government has initiated measures to whip up the nationalist 
sentiments to rejuvenate China.
In November 2012, Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and announced a new goal: ‘qiang 
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zhongguo meng—strong nation’s dream’. It was the Chinese Dream to 
be at the centre of the earth, through multiple means. President Xi 
Jinping is committed to achieving ‘the great rejuvenation of China by 
2049’—a hundred years after the PRC was formed on 1 October 1949. 
In this light, with an aim to undo the ‘Century of Humiliation’, China 
aims to restore its rightful place by 2049, or even earlier, by economic, 
military, political and strategic dominance. Xi’s dream has been to 
have a stronger nation with a strong military. Based on the envisaged 
threats and challenges, Xi had launched military reforms in 2015—with 
an ambition to achieve mechanisation and informatisation by 2020; 
military modernisation by 2035;17 and a world-class military by 2049. 
Simultaneously, China established five Theatre Commands (TCs) by 
February 2016, by amalgamating the erstwhile seven Military Regions 
(MRs). To further have tight control over the restive regions of Tibet 
and Xinjiang, Xi integrated Tibetan and Xinjiang military commands 
under the Western Theatre Command. China’s paramilitary force, and 
the People’s Armed Police (PAP) which were previously under the dual 
civilian and military command, have been placed firmly under China’s 
Central Military Commission (CMC), de facto under the Chairman Xi 
Jinping. Furthermore, China’s Coast Guard, which was previously a 
civilian agency, has been placed within the PAP, and is thus, now a part 
of the military command structure.18 
Military Interventions and Designs
At the global level, China has intervened militarily in various regions 
and places since 1949, a few of which are discussed briefly, which are as 
follows:
•	 Korean Campaign (1950): After a long spell of the civil war and 
subsequent formation of the PRC on 1 October 1949, the CPC and the 
PRC were in the process of consolidating and stabilising themselves. The 
Korean War (1950-1953) began when the North Korean Communist 
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Army crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded the non-Communist 
South Korea. The United States intervened to help South Korea. 
General Douglas MacArthur, who had commanded the Southwest 
Pacific in World War II (1939-1945), was in command of the US forces 
to hold off the North Koreans at Pusan perimeter, at the southernmost 
tip of Korea. After the famous amphibious assault on Inchon; Seoul, 
the capital of South Korea, was recaptured, and the US and UN forces 
crossed the 38th Parallel and the Yalu river.19 According to Akshat 
Upadhyay, the Chinese had set Yalu River as the boundary for the UN 
forces, the crossing of which brought the Chinese to intervene.20 The 
US and UN forces were surprised to find that the Chinese had secretly 
moved in 300,000 volunteer force, predominantly ethnic Korean PLA 
veterans, primarily to address their own security concerns. Although 
China was militarily weak and was itself in the process of stabilising 
itself, it intervened militarily with a design to secure its borders in the 
northeast. However, in doing so, it perhaps lost an opportunity to 
pursue its own ‘One China policy’ with Taiwan. 
•	 India-China War (1962): It is generally believed that Chairman 
Mao Zedong had decided to launch an offensive against India on 20 
October 1962, on both the eastern (North-East Frontier Agency-
NEFA) and western (Eastern Ladakh) sectors simultaneously. A few 
would argue that his larger aim was to ‘teach India a lesson’. It is 
not entirely true. Demographic evidence indicates that during 1958-
62, an estimated 30 million people died of starvation in China, due 
to Mao Zedong’s programme ‘Great Leap Forward’. The deaths 
were more than any other single famine in recorded human history.21 
Adding to it, in the spring of 1962, China faced renewed ethnic 
unrest in the frontiers, especially Xinjiang, during the economic crisis 
following the failure of the Great Leap Forward.22 
Therefore, more than the reasons for the alleged forward posture 
by the Indian Army in 1961, one of the main reasons for China’s 
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attack on India was to divert people’s attention from its internal 
conditions and low popularity of Mao Zedong in the late 1950s.23 
Having launched a major weight of his offensive on the eastern sector 
(NEFA), and achieved success, the Chinese withdrew to their side 
of the McMahon line in NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), on their 
own on 22 November 1962. However, they did not withdraw from 
the Western Sector (Ladakh region). The Chinese had apparently 
advanced up to their ‘1960 Claim Line’,24 from which they did not 
withdraw. Did it really mean that the Chinese had no claim on NEFA, 
as they withdrew without any pre-conditions? Or, was it primarily on 
account of its inability to sustain itself logistically, having stretched 
themselves on extremely difficult terrain?25 It is to note that China in 
fact does not have any claim on any territory in Arunachal Pradesh. 
However, in hindsight, the success in the said war gave the Chinese 
political, territorial, strategic, and military advantages. 
•	 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict (1969): It was a seven-month undeclared 
military conflict between the Soviet Union and China in 1969. On 
the border of China with the Soviet Union, the primary areas of 
conflict were the two islands of Qiliqin and Zhenbao on the Wusuli 
(Ussuri) river, and a part of Bolshoy Ussuriyski Island. As noted, in 
early March 1969, the Soviets and the Chinese troops were engaged 
in a conflict,26 and that the main aim of Mao Zedong was to trigger 
a massive internal mobilisation of his country’s resources, population 
and patriotic sentiments, which had been fractured completely in the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. According to the US Annual 
Congress Report of 2020, China’s contested border with the Soviet 
Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of a nuclear war.27 With 
the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border agreement, both sides resolved most of 
the border dispute between the two countries.
•	 Vietnam (1979): China intervened with a design to support the 
Khmer Rouge. It had political, strategic objectives, as also to look 
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after the ethnic Chinese minorities in Vietnam. In the end, China 
did not really succeed in dissuading Vietnam from its involvement 
in Cambodia, as the Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia till as 
late as 1989.
•	 Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96): China has never agreed to compromise 
over the sovereignty of Taiwan. It has provocatively demonstrated its 
military muscle on several occasions to integrate and unify the island 
with the mainland. On 23 March 1996, Taiwan was set to vote for 
the presidential elections, with the focus on the democratic process. 
The PRC conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests 
in and around the Taiwan Strait from 21 July 1995 to 23 March 
1996, to send a message to the Taiwanese electorate that voting 
for presidential elections would mean war.28 Going by the fact that 
the PRC conducted a near similar type of activation of the Taiwan 
Strait in 2020, it reinforces its design that even the 1995-96 crisis in 
Taiwan Strait was primarily to coerce and intimidate Taiwanese with 
their ‘One China Policy’. This area remains a flashpoint, which could 
trigger a conflict in the future.
Assertive and Expansionist Designs
Over the last three decades, and the last decade, in particular, China has 
grown in power and strength. The PRC has built its Comprehensive 
National Power (CNP), which is evident from its sustained economic 
growth, military strength, technology-enabled systems, ISR capabilities, 
information warfare, outer space and cyber capabilities. With all these, 
China, during the last decade, has been far more assertive and expansionist. 
As primarily evident from China moving into the South China Sea (SCS) 
for exploration of oil, but, as part of the long-term plan, it created artificial 
islands and built field fortifications in the SCS. As China’s nine-dash line 
claim is central to the territorial dispute in the resource-rich waters of the 
SCS, China has used grey zone aggressive tactics against other claimant 
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countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, by employing the maritime 
militia, and survey vessels to lay claims. Most recently, the foreign affairs 
department of the Philippines accused China of “belligerent actions” 
against their boats near the Scarborough Shoal.29
Apart from this, the PRC also declared Air Defence Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea with effect from 23 November 2013. 
Such a unilateral declaration by China drew reactions from Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the US. It has been argued that the creation of the 
new ADIZ can be compared to a condition similar to the creation of the 
Sansha military garrison in the South China Sea—an attempt to seek de 
facto control of claimed territories.30 
India-China Boundary Dispute: An Assessment
Historically, with the ‘Great Game’ at play in the nineteenth century, 
British India’s aim was to secure a buffer zone between British India 
and both China and Russia to maintain peace in the region. In doing so, 
after the collapse of China’s Qing dynasty in 1911, Sir Henry McMahon, 
Foreign Secretary to British India, drew the boundary between Tibet 
and British North East India in 1913-14, primarily based on the 
‘principle of Watershed’. With McMahon in the chair for the Tripartite 
Convention, and the representatives of Tibet (Lonchen Shatra Paljor 
Dorje, Dalai Lama’s experienced Prime Minister) and China (Ivan 
Chen) had attended and initialled the proceedings of the Convention 
at Shimla on 27 April 1914. Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative, 
explained that due to the conquest of Genghis Khan, Tibet had become 
a part of the Chinese Empire.31 China rejected the legal standing of the 
Shimla Convention, on the grounds of ‘Imperial legacy’. It also stated 
that Tibet was not a sovereign state to sign any treaty. Mao Zedong 
was aware of the significance of the geo-strategic location of Tibet with 
other countries that border it. It was in conformity with Ginsburg and 
Mathos who said, “[…] he who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan 
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piedmont; he who dominates Himalayan piedmont, threatens the 
Indian sub-continent […]”.32
The seeds of the boundary dispute between India and China were sown 
when PRC annexed and controlled Tibet after ‘the Tibetan delegates were 
imposed a 17-Point Agreement’33 on 23 May 1951. It further worsened 
with the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa to 
Khinzemane in NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) in March 1959. 
Historically, the Western Sector has remained most contentious, with 
several claim lines being referred to by both India and China.  In this 
sector, Aksai Chin is claimed by both India and China. India considers it 
as a part of the Union Territory of Ladakh (erstwhile part of Jammu and 
Kashmir). While China claims that it has been a part of the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region and Tibet Autonomous Region. History draws 
reference to 1831 when the Sikh empire had annexed Ladakh, which was 
followed by the Dogra—Tibet War and a Treaty in 1842.34 Thereafter, 
several claim lines were propagated: the Johnson Line (1965), the Foreign 
Office Line (1973), the Johnson-Ardagh Line (1897), the Macartney-
MacDonald Line (1899), and many more till the India-China War 1962. 
While maintaining its claim on Aksai Chin, China quotes historical 
presence of territorial occupation to justify its claims. China considers 
the MacDonald Line (1899) as the correct border with India. Among 
many other rationales, India considers Johnson Line (1865) as the legally 
correct national border with China, as it was shown as a part of Jammu and 
Kashmir (Ladakh is a part of it). The Maharaja of Kashmir had accepted 
this and even constructed a fort at Shahidullah, nearby Karakoram Pass in 
1865.35 In fact, the Postal Atlas of China in 1933 showed Aksai Chin as 
part of J&K.36 More notably, upon signing the Instrument of Accession 
on 26 October 1947, entire territories of the Princely State of Jammu and 
Kashmir legally and undisputedly became an integral part of India. 
Why the dispute? The India-China border is a notional cease-
fire line between India and China after the 1962 War. As the India-
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China boundary is neither delineated on the map nor demarcated on 
the ground, both countries have different lines of perceptions of the 
boundary. The 3,488 km border is broadly divided into three prominent 
sectors: the Eastern Sector which covers Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim; 
the Middle Sector in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; and the 
Western Sector in Ladakh. The term ‘Line of Actual Control’ is said to have 
been used by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in a 1959 note to Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.37 The alignment of the border as suggested 
in the said letter of 7 November 1959 was not accepted by the Indian 
Prime Minister. In the Agreement of 7 September 1993, the term ‘Line 
of Actual Control (LAC)’ was used in a formal bilateral agreement, called 
‘Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC 
in the India-China Border Areas’. While ground transgressions across the 
LAC have been taking place in all three sectors, it has been observed that 
the western sector, from where the Chinese troops did not withdraw after 
the cease-fire in 1962, continued to witness maximum violations across 
the LAC. The situation is precarious in the Western Sector because, unlike 
the Central and Eastern Sectors where the boundary runs predominantly 
along the watershed, the LAC in the Western Sector does not follow any 
well-defined geographical features. 
Even between the 1950s and 1962, and thereafter, China continues 
to incrementally transgress westwards of the LAC—referred to as salami 
slicing—and thus, create yet another claim line. A few cases in point are 
the major incidents of Nathu La (1967), Sumdorong Chu (1986-87), 
Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Eastern Ladakh (2020). 
Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in China between 
1966 and 1976 to reassert his authority over the Chinese government, 
which created huge internal turmoil and chaos, and negatively impacted 
its economy. In hindsight, it appears that the border skirmish between 
India and China at Nathu La in 1967 was triggered to divert the attention 
of its people from the chaos and killings that took place at the peak of the 
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Cultural Revolution, as also the tension building up on the border with 
Soviet Russia on Ussuri River. 
In this perspective, as the study of the settlement of border disputes 
would suggest that generally, China has not offered undue concessions 
where it saw economic and strategic advantages. 
During the preparations for the 19th National Congress of the CPC in 
2017, the PLA ventured to construct a road in Doklam—at the tri-junction 
of India, China and Bhutan. It resulted in a standoff for 72 days (18 June 
2017-28 August 2017). Such a move would have given China the strategic 
advantage, as Doklam is located between Tibet’s Chumbi Valley to the 
North, Bhutan’s Ha Valley to the East, and to India’s state of Sikkim to the 
West, as also would give access to the strategic Siliguri Corridor. What is 
noteworthy is that soon after the Doklam standoff, to realise the Chinese 
Dream, Xi announced on 18 October 2017 stating the “ […] we have 
developed a strategy for the military under new circumstances […]”.38  In 
this regard, with the growing influence of China in the IOR and in India’s 
strategic periphery, New Delhi needs to take note of China’s three warfare 
strategy : media, psychological and legal warfare. 
Incidents at the LAC
Although the 3,488 km border had remained without any incidents of firing 
since the border skirmish at Nathu La in 1967 and the firing at Tulung La 
in 1975, it has continued to witness incidents/transgressions across the LAC 
and standoffs. The tensions on the LAC are caused by three major factors: 
one, differing perception of the non—delineated and non-demarcated 
border; two, development of infrastructure close to or when perceived to 
be across the border; and three, movement of additional force levels and 
training exercises in proximity of the borders without informing the opposing 
side. While China has continued to build its infrastructure (roads, rails, 
bridges, airfields, heli-bases, oxygen stations, logistic warehouses, power, 
and communications networks) over the past two decades, surprisingly, it 
The Design in China’s aCTions anD Behaviour: an assessmenT
CLAWS Journal l Vol. 14, No. 1. Summer 2021 15
does not want India—which started much later—to build even the essential 
infrastructures on its own side of the border.
Strategic Significance of Eastern Ladakh 
According to the recorded statistics, there has been an increase in the 
incidents at the LAC since 2019, of which majority of them were in 
Eastern Ladakh (Western Sector). Therefore, it makes it imperative to 
analyse the strategic significance of Eastern Ladakh.
Eastern Ladakh is a sharp wedge with Gilgit-Baltistan to the west 
(Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, POJ&K), through which passes 
the CPEC linking Xinjiang to deep-sea harbour at Gwadar (Balochistan). 
China has a huge stake in the security of the CPEC. To safeguard its newly 
created strategic assets, China has positioned its security personnel at all 
important segments of the CPEC, especially in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. 
Also, Pakistan has raised Special Security Division (SSD), from Its regular 
and paramilitary forces, to provide security to the CPEC in its entirety, not 
confined to the Gilgit-Baltistan region alone. On the east lies the contentious 
Aksai Chin, about 38000 sq km, which is under the occupation of China. 
It falls both under the administrative jurisdiction of Xinjiang and TAR. 
China had also constructed a strategic road through Aksai Chin connecting 
Kashgar (Xinjiang) with Lhasa (Tibet), with 179 km road running through 
the northeast portion of Aksai Chin. In addition, there are lead and zinc 
mines in parts of the Aksai Chin.39 Given India’s claims to the Aksai Chin, 
China is sensitive to any development that threatens the security of the 
strategic China National Highway—G219. Immediately to the north of 
DBO—an airstrip at an altitude of 16,550 feet (Eastern Ladakh)—lie two 
important communication nodes cum choke points: first, the Karakoram 
Pass (5,540 m or 18,176 feet) about 18 km north of the DBO; second, 
the strategic communication network that connects Xinjiang with US$ 62 
billion CPEC Project in Pakistan, and the National Highway G219 (2,342 
km). On completion of the latter, it will be the longest National Highway 
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(over 10,000 km). Therefore, while Eastern Ladakh separates China and 
Pakistan by this sharp wedge, it also provides certain strategic options to 
India, and depth to our politically sensitive area of Chushul and other areas 
in the hinterland, as noted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Strategic Significance of Eastern Ladakh
 Source: Adapted from Chinoy (2020) and annotated by the author (rough alignments).
The strategic Darbuk-Shyok-DBO (DSDBO) road has been in the news 
as it has been constructed in about 18 years (2001-19), traversing some of 
the most inhospitable terrains and weather conditions. The 255 km road runs 
almost parallel to the LAC, being closest to the Galwan Valley. It provides 
access to the areas adjoining Hot Spring, Galwan Valley, Raki Nullah, Jiwan 
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Nullah and Chip Chap river. Given the altitude and difficulties experienced 
earlier by the Indian Army, it would certainly facilitate regular maintenance 
of troops, and strengthen India’s posture, both operationally and logistically. 
During the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), in Moscow in September 2020, China declared that 
it does not recognise the Union Territory of Ladakh and any infrastructure 
being constructed (meaning closer to the LAC) in it.  Interestingly, China 
did not raise any objection to the preparations and landing of an AN-32 on 
the airfield at DBO on 31 May 2008, after a gap of 45 years. Apparently, the 
Chinese have now felt threatened with the completion of the strategic road 
DSDBO, which was still under construction in 2008.  
China’s strategic interests are also evident from its increasing 
transgressions at the LAC. For instance, during a reply to an unstarred 
question (No. 1577) in the Lok Sabha on 27 November 2019,40 India’s 
Minister of State for Defence gave a year-wise details of the transgressions 
that entailed: 2016-273, 2017-426 and 2018-326. Concurrently, some 
details of incidents at the LAC (that includes post abrogation of Article 
370 on 5 August 2019) are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Chinese Transgressions at the LAC
Incidents on Line of Actual Control
Year West East Mid Total
2019 497 138 28 663
2018 284 89 31 404
2017 337 119 17 473
2016 208 71 17 296
2015 342 77 9 428
 (Western, Eastern, Middle Sectors)
   Source: Adapted from Singh (2020).41
Owing to the trend, it is noted that the incidents in the Western Sector 
of the LAC increased by about 75 per cent between 2018 and 2019; while 
the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim) witnessed almost 
one-fifth of the Chinese transgressions.42 Most notably, in the first four 
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months (January 2020-April 2020), post abrogation of Article 370 on 5 
August 2019, the number of incidents at the LAC were 170 (including 
130 in Ladakh) against 110 such instances in the same period in 2019.43 
Despite the spread of COVID-19 across the world, the Western Sector 
remained the focus of transgressions that finally resulted in the PLA’s 
premeditated transgressions at multiple points along the LAC in early 
May 2020. This further elucidates the design in China’s military posture.
Strategic Design towards Transgressions and Non-Resolution 
of the Boundary Dispute
Despite the border management mechanisms and confidence-building 
measures in place, and the periodic engagements at different levels, 
including the meeting between the heads of both India and China at 
Wuhan (May 2018) and Mammalapuram (October 2019) respectively, 
India and China met with a standoff at Naku La in Sikkim and Eastern 
Ladakh in early May 2020. It was a clear breach of the agreements and 
protocols by the Chinese. Further, the incidents at the LAC in May 2020—
during the peak period of the pandemic COVID-19—were marked by 
increased assertiveness and transgressions especially at multiple points in 
Eastern Ladakh, physical scuffles, and casualties on both sides; standoffs 
backed by build-up of large force levels including tanks, infantry combat 
vehicles, artillery and air defence guns, radars, and communication setups; 
and activation of the air bases closer to the LAC. 
What was noteworthy was India’s resolve and response mechanism 
against China on five counts: First, robust mobilisation and deployment 
of Indian forces to check the PLA’s designs and aggressiveness; second, 
occupation of strategic heights on the Kailash Range to the South of 
Pangong Tso, in the Chushul subsector in end August 2020; third, to build 
up and maintain logistics balance during the severe winters of Ladakh; 
fourth, to continue with the development of infrastructure on own side 
of the borders; and fifth, there was tacit support of all elements of national 
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power—political, economic, diplomatic, trade, investment, information—
to counter the Chinese’ designs. These actions had certainly changed the 
narrative and the equation between the two opposing forces that were 
deployed eyeball to eyeball. Given India’s political and military will to 
stand up to the Chinese designs, it has bolstered the confidence and morale 
of the Indian troops. India has sent a clear message that China must not 
indulge in incremental aggressive actions to lay claim to illegal territories, 
and that it would never be able to get any additional territory in Ladakh, as 
also in Arunachal Pradesh, as claimed by it, by use of force or otherwise. In 
other words, winning without fighting would be impossible!
In this context, the key query remains: Why did China choose to 
indulge in such aggressive actions in May 2020, especially when the 
pandemic COVID-19 was spreading at an alarming speed worldwide? 
More often, such actions are a result of the cumulative effect of many 
factors that continue to build up over a period of time, but get triggered 
by an incident. As Anath Krishnan suggests that as per a report authored 
by a senior figure at an influential Chinese think-tank, it has linked the 
current tensions along the LAC to India’s move in 2019 to abrogate 
Article 370 and change the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir—a 
decision that China had voiced opposition to.44 It may also be prudent to 
draw some inference from the following statements: 
•	 In a rare interview that Xi Jinping, then Governor of Fujian (1999 to 
2002), gave in August 2000 to a Chinese Journal stated: “If you want 
to become a General you must be able to win a battle ... […]. Only if 
there are battles, there are opportunities”.45
While attending a plenary meeting of the delegation of the PLA and 
PAP during the parliament session on 25 May 2020, 20 days after 
the continuing military standoff in Eastern Ladakh, Xi ordered the 
military to think about worst-case scenarios, scale up training and 
battle preparedness, promptly and effectively deal with all sorts of 
complex situations.46
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•	 While cautioning the US against a faltering China, Michael Beckley 
posited that, “China’s economic conditions have declined steadily since 
2008 Financial Crisis […]. When rising powers have suffered such 
slowdowns in the past, they become more repressive at home and more 
aggressive abroad”.47
China had been under pressure both on the domestic and international 
fronts: China’s economic slowdown,48 high rate of unemployment, 
internal security conditions especially with the persistent unrests in 
Hong Kong and Xinjiang, relationship with Taiwan, global resentment 
against China towards its aggressive actions in the South and East China 
Seas, and investigation of the origin and spread of the coronavirus. To 
support Pakistan, China had objected to India’s actions of abrogation 
of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir and declaration of Ladakh as a 
Union Territory. China needs to know that the abrogation of Article 370 
is India’s internal matter, and ever since then, the security and governance 
situation has certainly improved in Jammu and Kashmir. What can be 
construed is that more than any military aims, China perhaps wanted 
to send a strong message of it being a world power: that it can take 
all domestic and international pressures in its stride, and that India’s tilt 
towards the US would not be of much help. 
Agreements, Protocols and Visits
To maintain peace and tranquillity along the borders, both India and 
China have signed five important agreements and protocols between 
1993 and 2013. Out of the five such agreements, the agreement of 2005 
on “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of 
the India-China Boundary Question” has been most significant.49 In 
this, Article III mentions “[...] meaningful and mutually acceptable 
adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question....
Boundary settlement must be final, covering all sectors of India-China 
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Boundary”.50 While Articles VII and VIII mention “[...] safeguard due 
interests of their settled populations in the border areas” which mainly 
has reference to Tawang.51 Despite this agreement, the transgressions in 
the LAC continued, predominantly by the PLA. 
On 23 November 2006, the then Chinese President and General 
Secretary, Hu Jintao was expected to visit India, and also discuss the 
boundary dispute. However, a week before his arrival, the then Chinese 
Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, categorically issued a statement saying: 
“In our [China’s] position, the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is a Chinese 
territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of 
that. That is our position”.52 This can be interpreted as a Chinese design, 
wherein such a statement aimed at sending a message that India should 
not expect any meaningful discussion on the subject.
Interestingly, in early 2013, there was a great amount of publicity 
over the forthcoming visit of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India. 
Unsurprisingly, a month before the visit, on 15 April 2013, the PLA 
established a temporary camp at Depsang Plains on the Indian side, 
about 20 km across the LAC, due to which the tensions remained for 
three weeks. Again, the message was quite clear that any discussions on 
the boundary dispute were unlikely to yield any results. Similarly, in the 
event of President Xi Jinping’s visit to India on 18 September 2014, that 
marked the visit by a Chinese President after eight years, eight days prior 
to the visit, there was a serious incident at Chumar—shifting the focus on 
the LAC. India must be careful of China’s such a practice, as Shiv Shankar 
Menon argues the Chinese transgressions across the LAC is a “classic case 
of two steps forward one step back, which leaves China with a net gain 
of one step”.53
Also to note, since ancient times, the Himalayas have been an active 
bridge between Indian and Tibetan civilisation. However, post-Sino-
Indian War of 1962, this important civilisational link has been broken. 
While the land border extends over 3,488 km, there are only three land 
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ports across the entire stretch of the border; namely Shipki La (Himachal 
Pradesh), Lipulekh (Uttarakhand), and Nathula (Sikkim). Despite several 
traditional trade routes that existed between India and Tibet, the Chinese 
have not opened any land ports either in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh, 
which form over 80 per cent of the land border. Such actions are nothing 
but a design. 
As one can rightly point, most of the incidents narrated are more 
by design than by default. While Sun Tzu’s strategy of ‘deception, 
concealment and surprise’ remains central to winning without fighting, 
Graham Alison highlights that the Chinese have strategic patience and 
‘taking a long term view comes naturally to them’.54 These are in line with 
Henry Kissinger’s thoughts, as he suggests “[…] Chinese style of dealing 
with strategic decisions: thorough analysis; careful preparations; attention 
to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid 
conclusion”.55 However, contrary to these views, China has adopted an 
aggressive three-pronged strategy to counter global resentment against it 
in recent times, as witnessed in the form of—Debt Trap, Wolf Diplomacy 
and Military Coercion. 
Since it is difficult to know the exact reason for the Chinese aggression 
and escalation in May 2020, it was equally intriguing to see the PLA 
disengaging and withdrawing with speed, as per the timelines of the 
agreement. The question that needs an answer is: Would the India—
China boundary dispute be resolved in the near future? China considers 
India as one of its competitors in economic, political, and strategic 
space. Therefore, to stymie India’s ambition of becoming a regional cum 
global power, China would continue to resort to: First, exploit India’s 
vulnerabilities; second, keeping the boundary unsettled as it is of great 
advantage and a bargaining chip to China; third, ensure that India 
remains embroiled with the border disputes with Pakistan in the west, 
and China in the north, and thus, dilute India’s focus on the maritime 
domain (Indian Ocean Region) which is the battlespace of the future. 
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Besides, with an uncertain and volatile environment, it also ensures that 
India continues to support China on myriad issues at the global forums. 
Due to the sequence of events of the standoff, leading to casualties on 
both sides, there is a huge ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries. One 
cannot ignore the latest report of Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) which states that China’s military expenditure, the 
second-highest in the world, is estimated to have totalled US$ 252 billion 
in 2020, a rise of 1.9 per cent from the previous year. Chinese military 
spending has risen for 26 consecutive years.56 Also, considering the ‘all 
weather friendship’ between China and Pakistan, and with the work on 
the CPEC being executed on the ground in POJ&K, India must be wary 
of the China-Pakistan nexus. China has been building up its military 
preparedness in the Western Theatre Command—the largest theatre 
command covering the geographical areas of the two erstwhile military 
regions, namely Lanzhou and Chengdu. Considering the tension on the 
borders with China, while speaking at the ‘Hindustan Times Leadership 
Summit’ on 26 November 2020, India’s Minister of Defence, Rajnath 
Singh said, “the government has given a free hand to the armed forces to 
counter any changes across the LAC with China, with full force”.57 While 
India’s endeavour has been to resolve the boundary question to maintain 
peace and stability, it cannot be intimidated and coerced by the nuclear-
armed rival. Notwithstanding the differences, it is also to note that during 
the standoff on the Western Sector, both India and China have displayed 
realistic maturity in maintaining dialogue at different levels to defuse the 
tensions, disengage and eventually de-escalate.
Based on a series of talks between the senior military-diplomatic 
leaders of India and China, and Working Mechanism for Consultation 
and Coordination (WMCC), both the militaries have completed the 
withdrawal of troops, weapons and other military hardware from the 
north and south banks of Pangong Lake areas as part of an agreement. 
Both sides had agreed to continue with their discussions and negotiations 
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to ensure that a similar exercise of disengagement takes place at Gogra, 
Hot Spring, Galwan and Depsang Plains. However, it appears from the 
11th Round of Senior Military Commanders level talks that both sides 
could not reach an amicable process of disengagement and de-escalation 
for the remainder friction points. Apparently, the Chinese have reportedly 
hardened their stance regarding disengagement at other friction points. 
Therefore, unless the process of disengagement, de-escalation, and de-
induction of additional troops takes place by both sides, the situation 
would continue to remain tensed at the LAC.
Way Ahead
“China has made it clear that she doesn’t see the rise of India as being 
in her interest, whether it’s UN Security Council or NSG membership.”
—Shiv Shankar Menon 
Former Indian National Security Advisor58
Due to China’s aggressive designs, the biggest casualty in the 
relations between the two countries has been the ‘trust factor’. To face 
the challenges posed by China, India must be strong: economically, 
militarily, and technologically. It is well known that deterrence is a 
function of ‘capability, resolve and communication of the resolve on 
crossing of the threshold of tolerance’. Therefore, to address its security 
concerns, India needs to review its policy involving political, economic, 
trade and investment, military and information, public perception related 
Issues. Militarily, India should review its military strategy pertaining 
to building intelligence and surveillance capabilities, streamlining 
command and control systems, better management of disputed borders, 
development of infrastructure, building indigenous technology-
enabled systems, and cyber and Information warfare systems. With the 
allocation of additional budget, India should aim to build its capacity 
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and capabilities and improve its hard, soft, and demonstrated power to 
address its security concerns. India should be prepared for a long haul 
with the Chinese on the LAC.
To build bridges of understanding and trust, both India and China 
would have to adhere to the agreements and protocols, and remain 
transparent and sensitive to each other’s requirements. Both countries 
should also gradually build positive perception among the populace by 
various measures at different levels. China must realise that India, given 
its potential and resolve, would certainly take its place as a regional and 
global power in the near future. As noted, in March 2021, China called 
for India and China “to create enabling conditions for the settlement 
of the boundary dispute”.59 Therefore, to do so, it is time that both 
countries must act with a sense of urgency to restore the status quo on 
the LAC of April 2020, by disengaging and deescalating the situation. 
As the neighbours and two prominent nuclear-armed states of Asia, both 
countries should engage at all levels and work towards the resolution of 
the boundary dispute in an early timeframe to bring peace and stability in 
the region. The earlier the better!
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